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T
he current scale of mortgage delinquencies 
and foreclosures, particularly in the subprime 
market, has sparked a renewed debate over the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the 
regulations governing home mortgage lending. On one 
side, detractors argue that the CRA helped to precipitate 
the current crisis by encouraging lending in low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods.1 Economist Thomas 
DiLorenzo, for instance, wrote that the current housing 
crisis is "the direct result of thirty years of government 
policy that has forced banks to make bad loans to un-
creditworthy borrowers."2 Robert Litan of the Brookings 
Institution similarly suggested that the 1990s enhance-
ment of the CRA may have contributed to the current 
crisis. "If the CRA had not been so aggressively pushed," 
Litan said, "it is conceivable things would not be quite 
as bad. People have to be honest about that."3
On the other side, advocates of the CRA point to a 
number of reasons why the regulation should not be 
blamed for the current subprime crisis. Ellen Seidman, 
formerly the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
points out that the surge in subprime lending occurred 
long after the enactment of the CRA, and that in 1999 
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regulators specifically issued guidance to banks impos-
ing restraints on the riskiest forms of subprime lending.4 
In addition, researchers at the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors have reported that the majority of subprime 
loans were made by independent mortgage lending 
companies, which are not covered by the CRA and 
receive less regulatory scrutiny overall.5 In addition to be-
ing excluded from CRA obligations, independent mort-
gage companies are not regularly evaluated for “safety 
and soundness” (a key component of the regulatory 
oversight of banks) nor for their compliance with con-
sumer protections such as the Truth in Lending Act and 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.6 This has created what 
the late Federal Reserve Board Governor Ned Gramlich 
aptly termed, a “giant hole in the supervisory safety net.”7
What has been missing in this debate has been an 
empirical examination of the performance of loans made 
by institutions regulated under the CRA, versus those 
made by independent mortgage banks. The ability to 
conduct this research has been limited by the lack of a 
dataset that links information on loan origination with 
information on loan performance. In this study, we use  
a unique dataset that joins lender and origination 
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information from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) reports with data on loan performance from 
Lender Processing Services, Inc. Applied Analytics 
(LPS).8 We thus have access to information on bor-
rower characteristics (including race, income, and credit 
score), loan characteristics (including its loan-to-value 
ratio, whether it was a fixed or adjustable-rate mortgage, 
and the existence of a prepayment penalty), institutional 
characteristics (whether the lending institution was 
regulated under the CRA and the loan source), and loan 
performance (delinquency and foreclosure). 
In this article, we use these data to examine several 
interrelated questions: 
•  What is the neighborhood income distribution of 
loans made by independent mortgage companies 
versus those made by institutions regulated under 
the CRA?
•  After controlling for borrower credit risk, is there a 
difference in the foreclosure rates for loans made 
by independent mortgage companies versus those 
made by institutions regulated under the CRA?
•  How do other factors, such as loan terms and loan 
source, influence the likelihood of foreclosure?
•  How do the factors that influence foreclosure dif-
fer in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods 
compared with the factors in middle- and upper-
income neighborhoods?
The article is organized into four sections. In the first 
section, we provide background information on the CRA 
and review the existing literature on the relationship 
between the CRA and mortgage lending in low- and 
moderate-income communities. In the second section, 
we describe our data and methodology. The third section 
presents the results of our models. We conclude with the 
policy implications of this study and present suggestions 
for further research. 
The Community Reinvestment Act 
In 1977, concerned about the denial of credit to 
lower-income communities—both minority and white—
Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act. 
The CRA encourages federally insured banks and thrifts 
to meet the credit needs of the communities they serve, 
including low- and moderate-income areas, consis-
tent with safe-and-sound banking practices. Regulators 
consider a bank’s CRA record in determining whether 
to approve that institution’s application for mergers 
with, or acquisitions of, other depository institutions. A 
key component of the CRA is the Lending Test (which 
accounts for 50 percent of a Large Bank’s CRA rating), 
which evaluates the bank’s home mortgage, small-busi-
ness, small-farm, and community-development lending 
activity. In assigning the rating for mortgage lending, 
examiners consider the number and amount of loans 
to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas and 
whether or not they demonstrate “innovative or flexible 
lending practices.”9
The CRA has generated significant changes in how 
banks and thrifts view and serve low- and moderate-
income communities and consumers. Researchers who 
have studied the impact of the CRA find, on balance, 
that the regulations have reduced information costs and 
fostered competition among banks serving low-income 
areas, thereby generating larger volumes of lending from 
diverse sources and adding liquidity to the market.10 In 
a detailed review, William Apgar and Mark Duda of the 
Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University 
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concluded that the CRA has had a positive impact on 
low- and moderate-income communities. In particular, 
the study notes that “CRA-regulated lenders originate a 
higher proportion of loans to lower-income people and 
communities than they would if the CRA did not exist.”11
Since the passage of the CRA, however, the landscape 
of financial institutions serving low- and moderate-
income communities has changed considerably. Most 
notably, innovations in credit scoring, coupled with 
the expansion of the secondary market, have led to an 
explosion of subprime lending, especially in the last few 
years. According to one source, the subprime market 
accounted for fully 20 percent of all mortgage origina-
tions in 2005, with a value of over $600 billion.12 Many 
of these loans were not made by regulated financial 
institutions; indeed, more than half of subprime loans 
were made by independent mortgage companies, and 
another 30 percent were made by affiliates of banks or 
thrifts, which also are not subject to routine examination 
or supervision.13
Given the large role played by independent mortgage 
companies and brokers in originating subprime loans, 
there has been growing interest in extending the reach 
of the CRA to encompass these changes in the financial 
landscape. Yet to date, there has been little research that 
has empirically assessed individual loan performance at 
CRA-regulated institutions versus loan performance at 
independent mortgage companies, particularly within 
low- and moderate-income areas. Instead, most of the 
existing literature has focused on determining the share 
of subprime lending in low-income communities and 
among different racial groups.14 These studies, how-
ever, cannot assess whether loans made by institutions 
regulated by the CRA have performed better than those 
made by independent mortgage companies. Answering 
this question has been difficult given the lack of a single 
dataset that captures details on loan origination as well 
as details on loan performance. 
A few recent studies attempt to match data from dif-
ferent sources to shed light on pieces of this puzzle. Re-
searchers at Case Western’s Center on Urban Poverty and 
Community Development used a probabilistic matching 
technique to link mortgage records from the HMDA data 
with locally recorded mortgage documents and foreclo-
sure filings.15 They found that the risk of foreclosure for 
higher-priced loans, as reported in the HMDA data, was 
8.16 times higher than for loans that were not higher 
priced. They also found that loans originated by finan-
cial institutions without a local branch had foreclosure 
rates of 19.08 percent compared to only 2.43 percent for 
loans originated by local banks. 
Another recent study released by the Center for 
Community Capital at the University of North Carolina 
uses a propensity score matching technique to compare 
the performance of loans made through a LMI-targeted 
community lending program (the Community Advan-
tage Program [CAP] developed by Self-Help, a Commu-
nity Development Financial Institution) to a sample of 
subprime loans in the McDash database.16 They found 
that for borrowers with similar income and risk profiles, 
the estimated default risk was much lower for borrow-
ers with a prime loan made through the community 
lending program than with a subprime loan. In addi-
tion, they found that broker-origination, adjustable-rate 
mortgages and prepayment penalties all increased the 
likelihood of default. 
Both of these studies provide important insights 
into the relationship between subprime lending and 
foreclosure risk, and conclude that lending to low- and 
moderate-income communities is viable when those 
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loans are made responsibly. However, both studies 
are limited in certain important ways. Coulton and her 
colleagues do not examine the regulatory oversight 
of the banks that made the loans, and are only able 
to control for a limited number of borrower and loan 
characteristics. Ding and his colleagues are constrained 
by having access only to a relatively narrow subset of 
loans securitized by the CAP program. Because the 
sample of CAP mortgages may not be representative of a 
national sample of mortgage borrowers, and especially 
since being part of the CAP demonstration may influence 
the lender’s behavior and the quality of the loans 
they sell to Self-Help, the study’s findings may not be 
applicable to lending in low- and moderate-income 
areas more generally. 
In this study, we attempt to build on these research 
contributions by: (a) examining the performance of a 
sample of all loans (prime and subprime, and not limited 
to a specific demonstration program) made in California 
during the height of the housing boom; and (b) control-
ling for a wider range of variables, examining not only 
borrower characteristics, but assessing the influence of 
loan and lender variables on the probability of foreclo-
sure as well. 
 
Methodology
The quantitative analysis we use relies on a unique 
dataset that joins loan-level data submitted by financial 
institutions under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) of 197517 and a proprietary data set on loan 
performance collected by Lender Processing Services, 
Inc. Applied Analytics (LPS). Using a geographic cross-
walk file that provided corresponding zip codes to 
census tracts (weighted by the number of housing units), 
data were matched using a probabilistic matching 
method that accounted for the date of origination, the 
amount of the loan, the lien status, the type of loan, and 
the loan purpose. To check the robustness of the match-
ing procedure, we compared the sample statistics from 
the matched sample with the same sample statistics from 
the unmatched sample and found them to be similar. 
The LPS database provides loan information collected 
from approximately 15 mortgage servicers, including 
nine of the top ten, and covers roughly 60 percent of the 
mortgage market. Because the LPS includes both prime 
and subprime loans, the sample of loans tends to per-
form better than the sample in other databases such as 
Loan Performance First American’s subprime database. 
However, we believe that for this paper it is important to 
consider both prime and subprime loans in evaluating 
the performance of loans made by institutions regulated 
under the CRA, since presumably the original intent of 
the CRA was to extend “responsible” credit to low- and 
moderate-income communities.
For this paper, we limit our analysis to a sample of 
conventional, first-lien, owner-occupied loans originated 
in metropolitan areas in California between January 
2004 and December 2006. This time period represents 
the height of the subprime lending boom in Califor-
nia. We also limit our analysis in this instance to home 
purchase loans, although other studies have noted that 
much of the demand for mortgages during this period 
was driven by refinance loans and this will certainly be 
an area for further study. This leaves us with 239,101 
matched observations for our analysis. 
Borrower and Housing Market Characteristics
For borrower characteristics, we include information 
from the HMDA data on borrower race and/or ethnic-
ity. Most of the existing research on subprime lending 
has shown that race has an independent effect on the 
likelihood of obtaining a higher-priced loan.18 HMDA 
reporting requirements allow borrowers to report both 
an ethnicity designation (either “Hispanic or Latino” or 
“Not Hispanic or Latino”) and up to five racial desig-
nations (including “white” and “African American” or 
“black”). We code and refer to borrowers who were 
17	 	Enacted	by	Congress	in	1975,	the	Home	Mortgage	Disclosure	Act	(HMDA)	requires	banks,	savings	and	loan	associations,	and	other	financial	
institutions to publicly report detailed data on their mortgage lending activity. A depository institution (bank, savings and loan, thrift, and credit 
union)	must	report	HMDA	data	if	it	has	a	home	office	or	branch	in	a	metropolitan	statistical	area	(MSA)	and	has	assets	above	a	threshold	level	
that	is	adjusted	upward	every	year	by	the	rate	of	inflation.	For	the	year	2006,	the	asset	level	for	exemption	was	$35	million.	A	nondepository	
institution must report HMDA data if it has more than $10 million in assets and it originated 100 or more home purchase loans (including 
refinances	of	home	purchase	loans)	during	the	previous	calendar	year.	Beginning	in	2004,	lenders	were	required	to	report	pricing	information	
related	to	the	annual	percentage	rate	of	“higher-priced”	loans,	defined	as	a	first-lien	loan	with	a	spread	equal	to	or	greater	than	three	percent-
age points over the yield on a U.S. Treasury security of comparable maturity.
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identified as “Hispanic or Latino” and “white” as Latino, 
borrowers who were identified as “African American or 
black” as black, and borrowers who were identified as 
“Asian” as Asian. We code borrowers and refer to them 
as “white” if they are “Not Hispanic or Latino” and only 
identified as “white” in the race field. 
We use two other borrower-level variables in the 
analyses that follow. From the HMDA data, we include 
the borrower income, scaled in $1,000 increments. 
From the LPS data, we include the FICO credit score 
of the borrower at origination.19 Because FICO scores 
are generally grouped into “risk categories” rather than 
treated as a continuous variable, we distinguish between 
“low” (FICO < 640), “middle” (640 >= FICO < 720) and 
“high” (FICO >= 720) credit scores.20 We assume that 
lower credit scores would lead to a higher probability of 
delinquency and, subsequently, foreclosure. 
At the neighborhood level, we include the FFIEC 
income designation for each census tract, the same 
measure that is used in evaluating a bank’s CRA perfor-
mance. Low-income census tracts are those that have 
a median family income less than 50 percent of the 
area median income; moderate-income census tracts 
are those that have a median family income at least 50 
percent and less than 80 percent of the area median 
income; middle-income census tracts are those that have 
a median family income at least 80 percent and less than 
120 percent of the area median income; and upper-
income are those with a median family income above 
120 percent of the area median income. In addition to 
tract income, we also include variables from the 2000 
Census that attempt to capture the local housing stock, 
including the percent of owner-occupied units and the 
median year houses in the census tract were built.21 We 
also include the tract’s capitalization rate, defined as a 
ratio of the tract’s annualized median rent divided by 
the median house value. A larger value for this measure 
is consistent with lower expected price appreciation or 
more uncertain future house prices.22 We would expect 
this variable to be positively associated with the relative 
likelihood of foreclosure. 
In addition to neighborhood-level variables, we also 
include a variable on the performance of the local hous-
ing market. Economic research conducted at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston has shown that house price dynamics are 
an important predictor of foreclosure.23 Because current 
house values may be endogenously related to foreclo-
sure rates, we include an OFHEO variable that captures 
house price changes in the MSA/metropolitan division in 
the two years prior to the loan origination.24 We assume 
that loans originated during a time of significant house 
price appreciation will be more likely to be in foreclo-
sure, since it is areas that saw prices rising rapidly rela-
tive to fundamentals that have seen the most dramatic 
realignment of prices. 
Loan Characteristics
In the models that follow, we also include various 
loan characteristics that may affect the probability of 
foreclosure. From HMDA, we include whether or not 
the loan was a “higher-priced” loan. Researchers have 
shown a strong correlation between higher-priced loans 
and delinquency and foreclosure.25 Since higher-priced 
loans are presumably originated to respond to the cost 







changes that occurred in neighborhoods in California between 2000 and 2006, years of rapid housing construction and price appreciation.
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23	 	Doms,	Mark,	Frederick	Furlong,	and	John	Krainer	(2007).	“Subprime	Mortgage	Delinquency	Rates.”	Working	Paper	2007-33,	Federal	
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. See also: Gerardi, Kristopher, Adam Hale Shapiro, and Paul S. Willen (2007). “Subprime Outcomes: Risky 
Mortgages,	Homeownership	Experiences,	and	Foreclosures.”	Working	Paper	07-15,	Federal	Reserve	Bank	of	Boston.
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impaired credit scores), it is not surprising that this rela-
tionship exists. However, the current crisis has also shed 
light on the fact that many loans originated during the 
height of the subprime lending boom included addi-
tional features that can also influence default risk, such 
as adjustable mortgage rates, prepayment penalties, and 
the level of documentation associated with the loan.26 
For this reason, we include a wide range of variables 
in the LPS data on the terms of the loan, including the 
loan-to-value ratio, whether or not the loan has a fixed 
interest rate, whether or not it included a prepayment 
penalty at origination, and whether or not it was a fully 
documented loan. We also include data on the value 
of the monthly payment, scaled at $500 increments. 
While standard guidelines for underwriting suggest that 
monthly costs should not exceed 30 percent of a house-
hold’s income, recent field research suggests that many 
loans were underwritten at a much higher percent. 
Lender Characteristics
To determine whether or not a loan was originated 
by a CRA-regulated institution, we attach data on lender 
characteristics from the HMDA Lender File, following 
the insights of Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene (2007)27 
on how to use HMDA data to understand mortgage mar-
ket channels and the role of the CRA. We focus on two 
variables: whether or not the lender is regulated under 
the CRA, and whether or not the loan was originated 
within the lender’s CRA-defined assessment area, gener-
ally defined as a community where the bank or thrift 
maintains a branch location.28 
As was described above, CRA regulations apply only 
to the lending activity of deposit-taking organizations 
and their subsidiaries (and, in some instances, their 
affiliates). Independent mortgage companies not only 
fall outside the regulatory reach of the CRA but also a 
broader set of federal regulations and guidance designed 
to protect the “safety and soundness” of the lender.29 
In contrast to CRA-regulated institutions, independent 
mortgage companies are subject to state licensing and 
monitoring requirements and do not undergo routine 
examination.
We further distinguish between loans made by a 
CRA-regulated lender outside its assessment area and 
those made by a CRA-regulated lender within its assess-
ment area. Mortgages made by banks and thrifts in their 
assessment areas are subject to the most detailed CRA 
review, including on-site reviews and file checks. The 
assessment-area distinction also correlates with differ-
ences in the way mortgages are marketed and sold.30 For 
example, loans made to borrowers living inside the as-
sessment area are likely to come through the institution’s 
retail channel. In contrast, loans made to borrowers 
living outside the organization’s CRA-defined assessment 
area are more likely to be originated by loan correspon-
dents or mortgage brokers. We assume that if a lending 
entity subject to the CRA has a branch office in a metro-
politan statistical area (MSA), then that MSA is part of the 
entity’s assessment area. Loans made in MSAs where the 
lending entity does not have a branch office are assumed 
to be originated outside the entity’s assessment area.31 
Building on recent research suggesting the impor-
tance of mortgage brokers during the subprime lending 
boom,32 we also include a loan-source variable that 
captures the entity responsible for the loan origination, 
even if the loan eventually was financed by a CRA-
regulated lender or independent mortgage company. 
We control for whether the loan was made by a retail 
institution, a correspondent bank, or a wholesale lender. 
Wholesale lenders are third-party originators, generally 
mortgage brokers, that market and process the mortgage 
application. One important methodological note is that 
our models that include the loan-source variable are 
run on a smaller sample of loans. In these models, we 
26   Crews Cutts, Amy, and Robert Van Order (2005). “On the Economics of Subprime Lending.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 
30(2):	167–97.	See	also:	Immergluck	(2008).	“From	the	Subprime	to	the	Exotic.”
27   Apgar, William, Amal Bendimerad, and Ren Essene (2007). Mortgage Market Channels and Fair Lending: An Analysis of HMDA Data (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies).
28   We exclude loans originated by credit unions from this analysis; credit unions are not examined under the CRA and comprise a relatively small 
proportion	of	the	home-purchase	mortgage	market.
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exclude loans where loan source is equal to “servicing 
right” due to endogeneity concerns.33 Some financial 
institutions specialize in servicing “scratch and dent” 
mortgages, which, by their nature, would be more likely 
to foreclose.34 Indeed, in early models we found loans 
obtained through a servicing right were significantly 
more likely to be in foreclosure than loans originated by 
any other loan source. 
Findings
In Table 1 (at the end of this article), we present 
simple descriptive statistics that show the distribution 
of loan originations made by CRA-regulated institutions 
(CRA lenders) versus independent mortgage companies 
(IMCs), stratified by neighborhood income level. The 
table demonstrates the important role that IMCs have 
played in low- and moderate-income communities in 
California during the subprime boom. While CRA lend-
ers originated more loans in low- and moderate-income 
tracts than did IMCs, IMCs originated a much greater 
share of higher-priced loans in these communities. 
Indeed, more than half of the loans originated by IMCs 
in low-income communities were higher priced (52.4 
percent), compared with 29 percent of loans made by 
CRA lenders; in moderate-income communities, 46.1 
percent of loans originated by IMC lenders were higher 
priced, compared with 27.3 percent for CRA lenders. 
In addition, 12 percent of the loans made by IMCs in 
low-income census tracts and 10.3 percent of loans in 
moderate-income census tracts are in foreclosure, com-
pared with 7.2 percent of loans made by CRA lenders in 
low-income census tracts and 5.6 percent in moderate-
income census tracts. 
It is also worth noting the relatively small share of 
loans that were originated in low- and moderate-income 
communities; only 16 percent of loans made by CRA 
lenders were located in low- and moderate-income 
census tracts. IMCs made a slightly greater share of their 
total loans (20.5 percent) in low- and moderate-income 
communities. The relatively limited share of lending in 
low- and moderate-income communities may be due 
in part to the high cost of housing in California, yet it 
also suggests that on the whole, lending in low- and 
moderate-income communities remained a relatively 
small share of the lending market for regulated financial 
institutions, despite the incentive of the CRA.
These descriptive statistics, however, do not control 
for the wide range of borrower and loan characteristics 
that may influence the likelihood of foreclosure. For 
example, might the higher rates of foreclosure among 
IMC-originated loans be due to different risk profiles of 
the borrowers themselves? In the following tables, we 
present a series of binomial logistic regression models 
that predict the likelihood of a loan being in foreclosure, 
controlling for various borrower and loan characteris-
tics. In all the models, we cluster the standard errors 
by census tract because standard errors are likely not 
independent across time within tracts. We also examined 
the correlation among the independent variables in each 
of the models and found that although many of the fac-
tors we include are interrelated, the models perform well 
and the coefficients and standard errors do not change 
erratically across different model specifications. We pres-
ent the findings as odds ratios to assist in interpreting the 
coefficients.
In Table 2, we present the full model, including all 
variables with the exception of loan source. Several find-
ings stand out. First, metropolitan house-price changes 
do have a significant effect on the likelihood of foreclo-
sure. Rapid house-price appreciation in the two years 
preceding origination significantly increases the likeli-
hood of foreclosure (odds ratio 1.26). This is consistent 
with previous research that has linked foreclosures and 
delinquencies to local housing market conditions, par-
ticularly in California, where house prices rose quickly 
in relation to fundamentals and where subsequent cor-
rections have been quite dramatic.35 A higher percent 
of owner-occupied housing in a tract and more recent 
construction both also seem to increase the likelihood 
of foreclosure, but only slightly. The tract’s capitalization 
rate is not significant.
Second, and not surprisingly, FICO scores matter. A 
borrower with a FICO score of less than 640 is 4.1 times 





35   Doms, Furlong, and Krainer (2007). “Subprime Mortgage Delinquency Rates.”Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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more likely to be in foreclosure than a borrower with a 
FICO score of more than 720; for borrowers with a FICO 
score between 640 and 720, the odds ratio is 2.68. We 
also find that race has an independent effect on fore-
closure even after controlling for borrower income and 
credit score. In particular, African American borrowers 
were 1.8 times as likely as white borrowers to be in 
foreclosure, whereas Latino and Asian borrowers were, 
respectively, 1.4 and 1.3 times more likely to be in fore-
closure as white borrowers.36 The income of the neigh-
borhood also seems to have some effect on the fore-
closure rate. Loans located in low-income tracts were 
1.8 times more likely to be in foreclosure than those in 
upper-income tracts, with the risk declining monotoni-
cally as the income of the neighborhood increases.
Yet the model shows that even with controls for 
borrower characteristics included, the terms of the loan 
matter. Consistent with previous research, we find that 
higher-priced loans are significantly more likely (odds 
ratio 3.2) to be in foreclosure than those not desig-
nated as higher priced in the HMDA data. But we also 
find that other loan features—such as the presence of 
a prepayment penalty at origination, a fixed rate inter-
est loan, a high loan-to-value ratio, a large monthly 
payment in relation to income, and the loan’s level of 
documentation—all have a significant effect on the like-
lihood of foreclosure, even after controlling for whether 
the loan was a higher-priced loan or not. A fixed interest 
rate significantly and strongly reduces the likelihood of 
foreclosure (odds ratio 0.35), as does the presence of 
full documentation (odds ratio 0.61). An increase of ten 
percentage points in the loan-to-value ratio—for exam-
ple, from 80 to 90 percent loan-to-value—increases the 
likelihood of foreclosure by a factor of 3.0. 
What is interesting, however, is that even after con-
trolling for this wide range of borrower, neighborhood, 
and loan characteristics, loans made by lenders regulat-
ed under the CRA were significantly less likely to go into 
foreclosure than those made by IMCs (odds ratio 0.703). 
This provides compelling evidence that the performance 
of loans made by CRA-regulated institutions has been 
significantly stronger than those made by IMCs. 
Even more striking is what we find when we present 
the same model with the CRA lender status broken down 
by loans made within the CRA lenders’ assessment area 
and loans made outside the CRA lenders’ assessment 
area (with the omitted category being loans originated by 
IMCs). Presented in the second column of the table, we 
find that loans made by CRA lenders in their assessment 
areas were half as likely to be in foreclosure as loans 
made by IMCs (odds ratio 0.53). For loans made by a 
CRA lender outside its assessment area, the odds ratio is 
0.87. In other words, loans made by CRA lenders within 
their assessment areas, which receive the greatest regula-
tory scrutiny under the CRA, are significantly less likely 
to be in foreclosure than those made by independent 
mortgage companies that do not receive the same regula-
tory oversight. 
In Table 3, we add information about the source of 
the loan. As discussed earlier, we omit observations 
where the loan source is indicated as “servicing right.” 37 
The model demonstrates the importance of the originat-
ing mortgage-market channel in the performance of the 
loan. While the findings for other variables remained 
similar to those in models presented above, we find 
significant differences in the loan performance among 
loans originated at the retail branch, by a correspondent 
lender, or by a wholesale lender/mortgage broker. In 
particular, loans originated by a wholesale lender were 
twice as likely to be in foreclosure as those originated 
by a retail branch. This is a significant finding, and it 
supports other research that has shown that there were 
significant differences between broker and lender pricing 
on home loans, primarily on mortgages originated for 
borrowers with weaker credit histories.38 Interestingly, 
the inclusion of loan source also weakens the effect of 
the CRA variables. While loans made by CRA lenders 
within their assessment area are still less likely to go into 
foreclosure than those made by IMCs (an odds ratio of 
0.743), the coefficient for CRA loans made outside the 
assessment area is no longer significant. This suggests 
that the origination channel is a critical factor in deter-
mining the likelihood of foreclosure, even for CRA-regu-
lated institutions. 
36	 	In	some	additional	preliminary	analysis,	we	interacted	the	race	variables	with	income	and	found	some	variation	among	the	coefficients.	For	
example, while African American borrowers at all income levels were more likely to be in foreclosure, for Asian borrowers, as income went up, 
the risk of foreclosure decreased compared to white borrowers. The story for Latino borrowers was more mixed and warrants further research. 
However,	these	interaction	terms	did	not	meaningfully	alter	the	other	coefficients,	and	we	do	not	include	the	interaction	terms	here.
37   This decreases our sample size from 239,101 to 195,698.
38   Ernst, Bocia, and Li (2008). Steered Wrong.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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The Performance of CRA Lending in Low- and 
Moderate-Income Census Tracts
While the models above control for the income 
category of the neighborhood, they do not explore 
the relative performance of loans from CRA-regulated 
institutions within low- and moderate-income census 
tracts. In other words, on average, the loan performance 
of CRA lenders may be better than that of IMCs, but does 
this hold true within low- and moderate-income census 
tracts, the areas that are intended to benefit the most 
from the presence of the CRA? In Tables 4–7, we repli-
cate our analysis above by looking specifically at what 
happens when we stratify the models by neighborhood 
income level. For each neighborhood classification (low, 
moderate, middle, and upper), we present two models: 
the first including borrower and loan characteristics, and 
the second adding the loan source. Some interesting 
differences emerge, both in comparison to the full model 
and among the models for the different neighborhood 
income categories. 
Regarding the restriction of the sample to low-income 
neighborhoods, it is interesting to see that the effect of 
being a CRA lender loses much of its strength as well as 
its statistical significance. With no loan-source control, 
the point estimate indicates that CRA loans made outside 
the assessment area were only slightly less likely to be in 
foreclosure than loans made by IMCs (an odds ratio of 
0.95). However, loans made by a CRA lender within its 
assessment area remain quite a bit less likely (odds ratio 
of 0.73) to be in foreclosure than loans made by IMCs in 
the same neighborhoods, and the effect remains statis-
tically significant. In moderate-income communities, 
loans made by CRA lenders, both outside and within 
their assessment areas, are significantly less likely to be 
in foreclosure. In moderate-income communities, loans 
made by CRA-regulated institutions within their assess-
ment areas were 1.7 times less likely (an odds ratio of 
0.58) to be in foreclosure than those made by IMCs.
Yet, when we include the loan-source variable, the 
statistical significance of the effect of CRA lending in 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods disappears. 
It is possible that, in these neighborhoods, the explana-
tory variables other than the CRA-related variables fully 
capture the practical application of the prudent lending 
requirements of the CRA and other regulations. If this 
were the case, then regulations, working through those 
factors, would be significant underlying determinants of 
loan performance without the coefficients on the CRA-
related variables themselves showing up as statistically 
significant. That said, the estimation results do demon-
strate the importance of the terms of the loan and the 
origination source in predicting foreclosure, in particular, 
whether or not the loan was originated by a wholesale 
lender. Indeed, in low-income neighborhoods, whole-
sale loans were 2.8 times as likely to be in foreclosure 
as are those originated by the retail arm of the financial 
institution; in moderate-income neighborhoods, whole-
sale loans were two times as likely to be in foreclosure. 
Given that these regressions control for a wide range of 
both borrower and loan characteristics, it suggests that 
more attention be paid to the origination channel in 
ensuring responsible lending moving forward.
In the following tables, we present the same analy-
sis for middle- and upper-income census tracts. Here 
the results are more in line with the full sample. Loans 
made by CRA lenders within their assessment area are 
significantly less likely to be in foreclosure than those 
made by IMCs, even after controlling for the loan source. 
Although at first glance this may be counterintuitive—
why would the CRA have an effect in middle- and upper-
income areas?—we believe that this finding reflects 
much broader differences in market practices between 
regulated depository institutions and IMCs. Specifically, 
while the CRA may have provided regulated financial 
institutions with some incentive to lend in low- and 
moderate-income communities, the CRA is really only 
a small part of a much broader regulatory structure. This 
regulatory structure, as well as the very different business 
models of regulated financial institutions compared with 
IMCs, has significant implications for loan performance, 
only some aspects of which we have controlled for in 
our regressions. 
Although not our focus here, an interesting differ-
ence that emerges across neighborhood income clas-
sifications is the role of the loan-to-value ratio as well 
as the variable on previous house-price appreciation. In 
middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, these seem 
to carry more weight than in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods, suggesting that in higher income areas, 
investment and economic decisions may be more impor-
tant in predicting the likelihood that a borrower enters 
foreclosure. In contrast, in low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods, fixed rate and monthly payment seem to 
have relatively more importance in predicting the likeli-
hood of foreclosure, indicating that in these communi-
ties it may be more of an issue of short-term affordability. Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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While these findings are very preliminary and deserve 
further exploration, they do suggest that there may be 
important differences among communities regarding the 
factors that influence the sustainability of a loan.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This article presents the first empirical examination 
of the loan performance of institutions regulated under 
the CRA relative to that of IMCs using a large sample of 
loans originated in California during the subprime lend-
ing boom. Importantly, by matching data on mortgage 
originations from the HMDA with data on loan perfor-
mance from LPS, we are able to control for a wide range 
of factors that can influence the likelihood of foreclo-
sure, including borrower and neighborhood characteris-
tics, loan characteristics, lender characteristics, and the 
mortgage origination channel. 
Before turning to our conclusions and the policy 
implications of our research, we would like to empha-
size that these findings are preliminary, and additional 
research is needed to understand more fully the rela-
tionship between borrowers, lending institutions, loan 
characteristics, and loan performance. We see several 
important gaps in the literature that still need to be 
addressed. First, it is unclear whether or not our find-
ings for California are applicable to other housing and 
mortgage markets. The size and diversity of California 
lend it weight as a valid case study for the performance 
of CRA lending more generally. However, the high cost 
of housing in California may influence the nature of the 
findings, and it would be valuable to replicate this analy-
sis in other markets. Second, we focused our analysis on 
loans made in low- and moderate-income census tracts, 
given the CRA’s original “spatial” emphasis on the link 
between a bank’s retail deposit-gathering activities in 
a neighborhood and its obligation to meet local credit 
needs. A yet-unanswered question is the performance 
of CRA lending for low- and moderate- income borrow-
ers. In addition, we focus solely on mortgage lending 
activities and do not examine the impact that the CRA 
investment or service components may have had on the 
current crisis.39 Third, the continued importance of race 
as a variable deserves further exploration. In all of the 
models, African Americans were significantly more likely 
to be in foreclosure than whites. While some of this is 
likely due to differences in assets and wealth (which 
we cannot control for), additional research that can 
tease out the underlying reasons for this disparity may 
have important implications for fair-lending regulations. 
Fourth, we focus this analysis on lending for home pur-
chases, yet an examination of refinance loans may yield 
different results. Finally, it may be valuable to specify this 
model as a two-step process, where the choice of lender 
is modeled separately from loan outcomes, particularly if 
the decision to borrow from an IMC versus a CRA-regu-
lated institution is correlated with unobservable charac-
teristics that affect the likelihood of foreclosure.
Despite these caveats, we believe that this research 
should help to quell if not fully lay to rest the arguments 
that the CRA caused the current subprime lending boom 
by requiring banks to lend irresponsibly in low- and 
moderate-income areas. First, the data show that overall, 
lending to low- and moderate-income communities com-
prised only a small share of total lending by CRA lenders, 
even during the height of subprime lending in California. 
Second, we find loans originated by lenders regulated 
under the CRA in general were significantly less likely 
to be in foreclosure than those originated by IMCs. This 
held true even after controlling for a wide variety of bor-
rower and loan characteristics, including credit score, 
income, and whether or not the loan was higher priced. 
More important, we find that whether or not a loan was 
originated by a CRA lender within its assessment area is 
an even more important predictor of foreclosure. In gen-
eral, loans made by CRA lenders within their assessment 
areas were half as likely to go into foreclosure as those 
made by IMCs (Table 2). While certainly not conclusive, 
this suggests that the CRA, and particularly its emphasis 
on loans made within a lender’s assessment area, helped 
to ensure responsible lending, even during a period of 
overall declines in underwriting standards.40
The exception to this general finding is the signifi-




40   For an analysis of the quality of loans between 2001 and 2006 see Demyanyk Yuliya, and Otto van Hemert (2008). “Understanding the Sub-
prime Mortgage Crisis.” Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, February 4, 2008. Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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on loans made in low- and moderate-income neigh-
borhoods. In these regressions, when loan source was 
not included as an explanatory variable, loans from 
CRA-regulated institutions within their assessment areas 
performed significantly better than loans from IMCs. 
But, when we included loan source, the significance 
of the CRA variables disappeared. Even so, loans from 
CRA-regulated institutions certainly performed no 
worse than loans from IMCs. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, the practical application of the prudent lending 
requirements of the CRA (as well as other regulations) 
may have been captured in the other explanatory vari-
ables in the model without the coefficients on the CRA-
related variables themselves showing up as statistically 
significant. For example, 28 percent of loans made by 
CRA lenders in low-income areas within their assess-
ment area were fixed-rate loans; in comparison, 18.2 
percent of loans made by IMCs in low-income areas 
were fixed-rate. And only 12 percent of loans made by 
CRA lenders in low-income areas within their assess-
ment areas were higher priced, compared with 29 
percent in low-income areas outside their assessment 
areas and with 52.4 percent of loans made by IMCs in 
low-income areas.
Yet the finding that the origination source of the 
loan—retail, correspondent, or wholesale originated—
is an important predictor of foreclosure, particularly in 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, should not 
be ignored. This builds on evidence from other research 
that suggests that mortgage brokers are disproportion-
ately associated with the origination of higher-priced 
loans, particularly outside depository institutions’ CRA 
assessment areas41 and that mortgage brokers may be 
extracting materially higher payments from borrowers 
with lower credit scores and/or less knowledge of mort-
gage products.42 
The study also emphasizes the importance of respon-
sible underwriting in predicting the sustainability of a 
loan. Loan characteristics matter: a higher-priced loan, 
the presence of a prepayment penalty at origination, a 
high loan-to-value ratio, and a large monthly payment in 
relation to income all significantly increase the likeli-
hood of foreclosure, while a fixed interest rate and full 
documentation both decrease the likelihood of foreclo-
sure. For example, in low- and moderate-income com-
munities, higher-priced loans were 2.3 and 2.1 times, 
respectively, more likely to be in foreclosure than those 
that were not higher priced, even after controlling for 
other variables including loan source.
In that sense, our paper supports the need to reevalu-
ate the regulatory landscape to ensure that low- and 
moderate-income communities have adequate access to 
“responsible” credit. Many of the loans analyzed in this 
paper were made outside the direct purview of supervi-
sion under the CRA, either because the loan was made 
outside a CRA lender’s assessment area or because it was 
made by an IMC. Proposals to “modernize” the CRA, ei-
ther by expanding the scope of the CRA assessment area 
and/or by extending regulatory oversight to IMCs and 
other nonbank lenders, certainly deserve further con-
sideration.43 In addition, the study’s findings also lend 
weight to efforts to rethink the regulations and incentives 
that influence the practice of mortgage brokers.44
In conclusion, we believe that one of the more inter-
esting findings of our research is the evidence that some 
aspect of “local” presence seems to matter in predicting 
the sustainability of a loan: once a lender is removed 
from the community (outside their assessment area) 
or from the origination decision (wholesale loan), the 
likelihood of foreclosure increases significantly. For low- 
and moderate-income borrowers and communities, a 
return to localized lending may be even more important. 
Research on lending behavior has suggested that “social 
relationships and networks affect who gets capital and 
at what cost.”45 Particularly in communities that have 
traditionally been denied credit, and where intergenera-
41	 	Kenneth	P.	Brevoort,	and	Glenn	B.	Canner	(2006).	“Higher-Priced	Home	Lending	and	the	2005	HMDA	Data.”	Federal	Reserve	Bulletin	
(September 8): A123–A166.
42   Ernst, Bocia, and Li (2008). Steered Wrong.
43	 	Apgar	and	Duda	(2003).	“The	Twenty-Fifth	Anniversary	of	the	Community	Reinvestment	Act.”	
44   Ernst, Bocia, and Li (2008). Steered Wrong.
45	 	Uzzi,	Brian	(1999).	“Embeddedness	in	the	Making	of	Financial	Capital:	How	Social	Relations	and	Networks	Benefit	Firms	Seeking	
Financing.”	American	Sociological	Review	64(4):	481–505.	See	also:	Holmes,	Jessica,	Jonathan	Isham,	Ryan	Petersen,	and	Paul	Sommers	
(2007). “Does Relationship Lending Still Matter in the Consumer Banking Sector? Evidence from the Automobile Loan Market.” Social 
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tional wealth and knowledge transfers integral to the 
home-ownership experience may be missing, social 
networks and local presence may be a vital component 
of responsible lending (see Moulton 2008 for an excel-
lent overview of how these localized social networks 
may influence mortgage outcomes, for example, by fill-
ing information gaps for both lenders and borrowers).46 
Indeed, the relatively strong performance of loans 
originated as part of statewide affordable lending 
programs,47 Self-Help’s Community Action Program,48 
and loans originated as part of Individual Development 
Account programs49 all suggest that lending to low- and 
moderate-income communities can be sustainable. 
Going forward, increasing the scale of these types of 
targeted lending activities—all of which are encouraged 
under the CRA—is likely to do a better job of meeting 
the credit needs of all communities and promoting sus-
tainable homeownership than flooding the market with 
poorly underwritten, higher-priced loans. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Lending Activity: CRA Lenders vs. Independent Mortgage Companies
 
  CRA Lenders  Independent Mortgage
    Companies
Total Loans 
Low-Income Neighborhood  3,843  1,487
Moderate-Income Neighborhood  24,795  10,609
Middle-Income Neighborhood  67,766  24,606
Upper-Income Neighborhood  83,563  22,432
All Neighborhoods  179,967  59,134
 
Total High-Priced Loans 
Low-Income Neighborhood  1,116  779
Moderate-Income Neighborhood  6,765  4,892
Middle-Income Neighborhood  10,573  8,068
Upper-Income Neighborhood  5,307  4,338
All Neighborhoods  23,761  18,077
 
Total Foreclosures 
Low-Income Neighborhood  275  177
Moderate-Income Neighborhood  1,379  1,092
Middle-Income Neighborhood  2,517  1,945
Upper-Income Neighborhood  1,613  1,211
All Neighborhoods  5,784  4,425Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Table 2: Model Predicting the Likelihood of Loan Foreclosure
 
 
      CRA with
     CRA     Assessment Area
    Standard    Standard
  Odds Ratio  Error   Odds Ratio  Error
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
Neighborhood Income Level (omitted: Upper-Income) 
Low-Income  1.79 ***  0.149   1.73 ***  0.142 
Moderate-Income  1.32 ***  0.067   1.28 ***  0.064 
Middle-Income  1.21 ***  0.045   1.18 ***  0.044 
 
Percent Owner-Occupied  1.00 ***  8.69x10-4  1.00 ***  8.68x10-4
 
Median Year Housing Built  1.01 ***  0.001   1.01 ***  0.001 
 
Capitalization Rate  0.85   0.515   0.75   0.451 
 
House Price Appreciation (2 years prior to origination)  1.26 ***  0.019   1.22 ***  0.019 
 
BORROWER VARIABLES 
Borrower Race (omitted: Non-Hispanic White) 
African American  1.78 ***  0.084   1.79 ***  0.084 
Latino  1.36 ***  0.044   1.36 ***  0.044 
Asian  1.29 ***  0.052   1.29 ***  0.052 
 
Borrower Income  1.00 **  7.17x10-5  1.00 **  7.26x10-5
 
Borrower FICO Score (omitted: High - Above 720) 
Low FICO - Below 640  4.09 ***  0.166   4.07 ***  0.165 
Mid-level FICO - 640-720  2.68 ***  0.087   2.65 ***  0.086
 
LOAN VARIABLES 
Higher-Priced Loan (yes=1)  3.23 ***  0.004   3.05 ***  0.104 
Fixed Interest Rate (yes=1)  0.35 ***  0.017   0.35 ***  0.017 
Prepayment Penalty (yes=1)  1.30 ***  0.036   1.31 ***  0.036 
Full Documentation (yes=1)  0.61 ***  0.021   0.63 ***  0.022 
Monthly Payment  1.06 ***  0.110   1.05 ***  0.004 
Loan-to-Value Ratio  3.00 ***  0.080   3.02 ***  0.081
 
LENDER VARIABLES 
CRA (omitted: Independent Mortgage Company)  0.70 ***  0.018    
CRA in Assessment Area        0.53 ***  0.017 
CRA outside Assessment Area        0.87 ***  0.024  
Observations  236,536
    
*(**)(***) Statistically significant at 10(5)(1) level.      Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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CRA with 
Assessment Area   
Table 3: Model Predicting the Likelihood of Loan Foreclosure, includes Loan Source
 
 
   
      
    Standard 
  Odds Ratio  Error  
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
Neighborhood Income Level (omitted: Upper-Income) 
Low-Income  2.11  ***  0.232  
Moderate-Income  1.35  ***  0.096   
Middle-Income  1.24  ***  0.063  
 
Percent Owner-Occupied  1.00  ***  0.001  
 
Median Year Housing Built  1.01  ***  0.002   
 
Capitalization Rate  0.85    0.680  
 
House Price Appreciation (2 years prior to origination)  1.20  ***  0.026 
 
BORROWER VARIABLES 
Borrower Race (omitted: Non-Hispanic White) 
African American  1.77  ***  0.127   
Latino  1.38  ***  0.066  
Asian  1.24  ***  0.067  
 
Borrower Income  1.00  **  8.91x10-5 
 
Borrower FICO Score (omitted: High - Above 720) 
Low FICO - Below 640  4.58  ***  0.266  
Mid-level FICO - 640-720  2.73  ***  0.124  
 
LOAN VARIABLES 
Higher-Priced Loan (yes=1)  2.47  ***  0.119   
Fixed Interest Rate (yes=1)  0.39  ***  0.025    
Prepayment Penalty (yes=1)  1.55  ***  0.072
Full Documentation (yes=1)  0.63  ***  0.027    
Monthly Payment  1.05  ***  0.005  
Loan-to-Value Ratio  2.53  ***  0.078   
 
LENDER VARIABLES 
CRA (omitted: Independent Mortgage Company)  0.70  ***  0.018   
CRA in Assessment Area  0.743  ***  0.043
CRA outside Assessment Area  0.995    0.057 
  
Loan Source (omitted: retail branch) 
Correspondent Loan  1.45  ***  0.092 
Wholesale Loan  2.03  ***  0.099
Observations  195,698     
*(**)(***) Statistically significant at 10(5)(1) level.Table 4: Model Predicting the Likelihood of Loan Foreclosure in Low-Income Neighborhoods
 
 
        CRA     CRA with Assessment
     Assessment Area      Area and Loan Source
    Standard    Standard
  Odds Ratio  Error   Odds Ratio  Error
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
 
Percent Owner-Occupied  1.01 ***  0.005   1.01   0.008 
 
Median Year Housing Built  1.00   0.006   1.00   0.008 
 
Capitalization Rate  0.64   0.742   0.35   0.685 
 
House Price Appreciation (2 years prior to origination)  1.16 *  0.092   1.17   0.125 
 
BORROWER VARIABLES 
Borrower Race (omitted: Non-Hispanic White) 
African American  1.75 **  0.393   1.96 *  0.728 
Latino  0.95   0.121   1.09   0.291 
Asian  1.25   0.280   1.43   0.396 
 
Borrower Income  1.00   4.43x10-4  1.00   6.97x10-4
 
Borrower FICO Score (omitted: High - Above 720) 
Low FICO - Below 640  4.10 ***  0.783   4.00 ***  1.130 
Mid-level FICO - 640-720  2.41 ***  0.434   2.48 ***  0.632 
 
LOAN VARIABLES 
Higher-Priced Loan (yes=1)  3.12 ***  0.559   2.31 ***  0.591 
Fixed Interest Rate (yes=1)  0.29 ***  0.081   0.27 ***  0.104 
Prepayment Penalty (yes=1)  1.28 *  0.180   1.42   0.361 
Full Documentation (yes=1)  0.71 **  0.114   0.84   0.150 
Monthly Payment  1.10 ***  0.031   1.15 ***  0.037 
Loan-to-Value Ratio  2.35 ***  0.220   1.81 ***  0.262 
 
LENDER VARIABLES 
CRA (omitted: Independent Mortgage Company)    
CRA in Assessment Area  0.73 **  0.115  0.89   0.264 
CRA outside Assessment Area  0.95   0.121  0.86   0.244    
 
Loan Source (omitted: retail branch) 
Correspondent Loan        1.58   0.536
Wholesale Loan        2.79 ***  0.702
Observations  5,271    3,981     
*(**)(***) Statistically significant at 10(5)(1) level.
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        CRA     CRA with Assessment
     Assessment Area      Area and Loan Source
    Standard    Standard
  Odds Ratio  Error   Odds Ratio  Error
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
 
Percent Owner-Occupied  1.00 **  0.002   1.00 **  0.002 
 
Median Year Housing Built  1.00   0.002   1.00   0.003 
 
Capitalization Rate  1.21   1.160   0.58   0.806 
 
House Price Appreciation (2 years prior to origination)  1.10 ***  0.033   1.10 **  0.048 
 
BORROWER VARIABLES 
Borrower Race (omitted: Non-Hispanic White) 
African American  2.13 ***  0.202   1.88 ***  0.269 
Latino  1.32 ***  0.089   1.17   0.117 
Asian  1.27 ***  0.115   1.15   0.145 
 
Borrower Income  1.00   1.37x10-4  1.00   1.14x10-4
 
Borrower FICO Score (omitted: High - Above 720) 
Low FICO - Below 640  3.69 ***  0.310   3.72 ***  0.475 
Mid-level FICO - 640-720  2.29 ***  0.162   2.38 ***  0.242 
 
LOAN VARIABLES 
Higher-Priced Loan (yes=1)  2.64 ***  0.181   2.07 ***  0.207  
Fixed Interest Rate (yes=1)  0.30 ***  0.032   0.37 ***  0.053
Prepayment Penalty (yes=1)  1.14 ***  0.057   1.55 ***  0.148 
Full Documentation (yes=1)  0.73 ***  0.505   0.73 ***  0.062 
Monthly Payment  1.09 ***  0.011   1.10 ***  0.015 
Loan-to-Value Ratio  2.49 ***  0.106   2.04 ***  0.125 
 
LENDER VARIABLES 
CRA (omitted: Independent Mortgage Company)    
CRA in Assessment Area  0.58 ***  0.04  0.96   0.119 
CRA outside Assessment Area  0.84 ***  0.048  1.17   0.143     
 
Loan Source (omitted: retail branch) 
Correspondent Loan        1.62 ***  0.221 
Wholesale Loan        1.96 ***  0.212 
Observations  34,933    26,248     
*(**)(***) Statistically significant at 10(5)(1) level.
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        CRA     CRA with Assessment
     Assessment Area      Area and Loan Source
    Standard    Standard
  Odds Ratio  Error   Odds Ratio  Error
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
 
Percent Owner-Occupied  1.01 ***  0.001   1.01 ***  0.002  
 
Median Year Housing Built  1.01 ***  0.002   1.00   0.002 
 
Capitalization Rate  0.69   0.636   2.27   2.920  
 
House Price Appreciation (2 years prior to origination)  1.27 ***  0.030   1.23 ***  0.041  
 
BORROWER VARIABLES 
Borrower Race (omitted: Non-Hispanic White) 
African American  1.53 ***  0.113   1.52 ***  0.176 
Latino  1.33 ***  0.063   1.31 ***  0.091
Asian  1.17 ***  0.073   1.09   0.093
 
Borrower Income  1.00 ***  1.14x10-4  1.00 ***  1.42x10-4
 
Borrower FICO Score (omitted: High - Above 720) 
Low FICO - Below 640  4.22 ***  0.261   5.13 ***  0.454 
Mid-level FICO - 640-720  2.68 ***  0.130   2.82 ***  0.201
 
LOAN VARIABLES 
Higher-Priced Loan (yes=1)  2.93 ***  0.142   2.34 ***  0.172 
Fixed Interest Rate (yes=1)  0.34 ***  0.025   0.35 ***  0.035
Prepayment Penalty (yes=1)  1.30 ***  0.055   1.51 ***  0.111
Full Documentation (yes=1)  0.61 ***  0.034   0.59 ***  0.040 
Monthly Payment  1.06 ***  0.008   1.06 ***  0.010 
Loan-to-Value Ratio  3.10 ***  0.159   2.67 ***  0.127
 
LENDER VARIABLES 
CRA (omitted: Independent Mortgage Company)    
CRA in Assessment Area  0.56 ***  0.028  0.80 ***  0.072  
CRA outside Assessment Area  0.92 ***  0.038  1.06   0.091     
 
Loan Source (omitted: retail branch) 
Correspondent Loan        1.39 ***  0.129  
Wholesale Loan        1.97 ***  0.147 
Observations  91,400    73,603     
*(**)(***) Statistically significant at 10(5)(1) level.
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        CRA     CRA with Assessment
     Assessment Area      Area and Loan Source
    Standard    Standard
  Odds Ratio  Error   Odds Ratio  Error
NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES 
 
Percent Owner-Occupied  1.01 ***  0.002   1.00 ***  0.002   
 
Median Year Housing Built  1.01 ***  0.002   1.01 ***  0.003  
 
Capitalization Rate  2.79   4.720   3.93   8.280  
 
House Price Appreciation (2 years prior to origination)  1.27 ***  0.039   1.26 ***  0.051  
 
BORROWER VARIABLES 
Borrower Race (omitted: Non-Hispanic White) 
African American  1.67 ***  0.148   1.69 ***  0.218
Latino  1.47 ***  0.088   1.65 ***  0.141
Asian  1.38 ***  0.096   1.33 ***  0.117
 
Borrower Income  1.00 ***  1.09x10-4  1.00 ***  1.68x10-4
 
Borrower FICO Score (omitted: High - Above 720) 
Low FICO - Below 640  3.99 ***  0.301   4.64 ***  0.498
Mid-level FICO - 640-720  2.83 ***  0.162   2.83 ***  0.213 
 
LOAN VARIABLES 
Higher-Priced Loan (yes=1)  3.44 ***  0.225   2.96 ***  0.248
Fixed Interest Rate (yes=1)  0.41 ***  0.032   0.45 ***  0.045 
Prepayment Penalty (yes=1)  1.40 ***  0.074   1.50 ***  0.119 
Full Documentation (yes=1)  0.57 ***  0.036   0.59 ***  0.048 
Monthly Payment  1.04 ***  0.006   1.05 ***  0.007 
Loan-to-Value Ratio  3.52 ***  0.127   2.89 ***  0.152
 
LENDER VARIABLES 
CRA (omitted: Independent Mortgage Company)    
CRA in Assessment Area  0.49 ***  0.028  0.64 ***  0.067  
CRA outside Assessment Area  0.84 ***  0.046  0.93   0.096     
 
Loan Source (omitted: retail branch) 
Correspondent Loan        1.37 ***  0.164  
Wholesale Loan        2.12 ***  0.180
Observations  104,932    91,866     
*(**)(***) Statistically significant at 10(5)(1) level.
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